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Since its inception, Frontex has been at the forefront of the Union’s policy in the
field of external border management. In the wake of the 2015 ‘migratory crisis’,
Frontex underwent a swift and unprecedented upgrade of its powers, resources, and
capacities. The 2016 and 2019 mandate revisions arguably mark a ‘quantum leap’
gradually transforming Frontex into a more integrated and hierarchical administrative
body. One of the most spectacular developments introduced by the recent reforms
concerns the territorial extension of the agency’s operations. Henceforth, Frontex
is mandated to carry out operational activities, including executive powers, in
third countries. This blog post first sketches out the agency’s successive mandate
expansions allowing for a broader geographic theatre of operations. It then examines
the law currently governing the exterritorial activities of Frontex, in particular the
recently concluded status agreements with Western Balkan countries.
The salience of the agency’s international
dimension
The continuous recalibration of the agency’s mandate is somehow symptomatic of
the integration path towards a full-fledged European integrated border management
(EIBM). International cooperation is a key component of the EIBM, as the effective
management of external borders and migratory challenges relies on cooperation
with countries of origin, countries of transit, or neighbouring countries. The original
EIBM concept acknowledged this through its four-tier access control premised
upon measures in (neighbouring) third countries, and by emphasizing international
cooperation as one of its core dimensions. It is therefore not surprising that
international cooperation has been at the core of Frontex’s successive mandate
overhauls.
In general, Frontex’s external relations activities revolve around two interlinked axes,
namely: (1) supporting cooperation between Member States and third countries; (2)
implementing EU policies in the field of migration and border management. This job
description also applies to the agency’s geographically broadened operational remit.
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The gradual expansion of Frontex’s operations to
the territory of third countries
Before 2016, Frontex could deploy liaison officers, launch technical assistance
projects or, within the framework of working arrangements with competent
authorities, carry out exchanges of information in third countries. But the agency
was not allowed to conduct operational actions on the territory of third countries by
deploying border guard teams in the context of joint operations.
Regulation 2016/1624 fundamentally changed this. Through its Article 54(3),
it enabled Frontex to conduct operations on the territory of neighbouring third
countries. This in the context of coordinating operational cooperation between
these countries and Member States requiring increased technical and operational
assistance. What is more, the agency was enabled to send teams to third countries
provided the following conditions were met: (1) an operational plan drafted jointly
by the agency and the neighbouring country for each action; and (2) receiving the
agreement of the bordering EU Member States(s); (3) according to Article 54(4), a
status agreement based on Article 218 TFEU between the EU (not Frontex) and the
concerned third country.
A closer look reveals a mismatch between Article 54(3) and Article 54(4). Article
54(3) specifically envisaged operational activities in a neighbouring third country in
the context of actions at the EU external borders with that country. Yet Article 54(4)
foresaw arguably a broader use of status agreements: when teams are deployed in
third countries (without specifying that it had to be neighbouring). The Commission’s
2016 model status agreement based on Article 54(5) did not do much to clarify this.
The 2019 Frontex Regulation, however,explicitly allows the agency to henceforth
carry out operations on the territory of any third country (Article 74). The scope of
status agreements was even extended to the establishment of Frontex antenna
offices in third countries, as operational structures intended to facilitate coordination
of operational cooperation.
From theory to practice: status agreements with
Western Balkan countries
But let’s return to 2016. Article 54(4) stipulated that status agreements should
deal with ‘all aspects (…) necessary for carrying out the actions’ in particular the
scope of operations, the tasks and powers of the team members, civil and criminal
liability issues, and fundamental rights safeguards. The Commission’s model
status agreement was more detailed as it covered the types of operations to be
carried out in third countries, the operational plan, the conditions for exercising
executive powers including use of force, privileges and immunities of team members,
suspension/termination of operations, and dispute settlement. Hence, Frontex status
agreements look quite like the status of forces agreements (SOFAs) and status
of mission agreements (SOMAs) the EU concludes in the context of its military
operations and civilian missions in third countries. Interestingly, the Commission
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extended the scope of status agreements to include return operations from Member
States to the respective third country. Such operations went arguably beyond the
scope of Article 54(3) as they do not take place per se at the border between a
Member State and a neighbouring third country, nor do they require an operational
plan.
In line with the Union’s cooperation strategy with Western Balkan countries, status
agreements were initialled with five countries, namely Albania, North Macedonia,
Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro between 2018–2019. So far,
three status agreements have been concluded (Albania, Montenegro, and Serbia),
while the remaining two (with North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) are
pending signature. The status agreement with Albania was the first (and so far the
only one) to enter into force on 1 May 2019, with the first Frontex coordinated joint
operation on the territory of a third country ever being launched on 21 May 2019 at
the Albanian border with Greece.
The Frontex status agreements concluded so far follow closely the Commission’s
model agreement. Next to joint operations and rapid border interventions in the
context of operational cooperation at the external borders, they also cover return
operations to that country. The status agreements follow the rather minimalist
approach to the operational plan in the Commission’s model agreement, as they,
in contrast to the Frontex Regulation, do not explicitly include some important
aspects among the mandatory elements of the plan (e.g. duration of the operation,
its geographical area, immediate incident reporting procedures). 
The extraterritorial exercise of executive powers and
use of force
One of the most sensitive aspects dealt with in the status agreements concerns
the exercise of executive powers, including the use of force by team members.
Interestingly, only the agreement with Albania provides a definition of executive
powers as ‘the powers necessary to perform the tasks required for border control
and return operations which are conducted (…) during a joint action as included
in the operational plan’ (Article 2(12)). From the press release announcing the first
Frontex-led joint operation in Albania, it transpires that such executive powers may
pertain, for instance, to performing border checks at crossing points and preventing
unauthorized entries. All other agreements contain a rather vague horizontal
provision stipulating that all team members are authorized to ‘perform the tasks and
exercise the executive powers required for border control and return operations’. It
would therefore be judicious that the tasks and executive powers of team members
will be clearly and exhaustively defined in the operational plan of each action.
The general principles governing the exercise of powers by the members of the
teams entail (1) respecting the laws of the third country, and (2) acting under the
instructions and in the presence of third country competent staff. Exceptionally, the
competent third country authority may authorize team members to act on its behalf.
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Force may be used only with the consent of the home Member State and the third
country, in the presence of third country competent staff, and in accordance with its
relevant legislation. Also here is possible to deviate from the general rule, as team
members may be authorized to use force in the absence of third country competent
staff; however, none of the agreements provides for further conditions, limitations, or
procedural details regarding this derogation.
Another important operational tool at the disposal of Frontex-led teams consists of
the possibility to gain access to (personal) data in the national databases of the third
country. Accessing such data is allowed if (1) it is necessary for fulfilling operational
aims and (2) it is limited to what is necessary for performing team members’ tasks
and executive powers. These two conditions should be clearly specified in the
operational plan to prevent that they are interpreted too broadly in practice.
As a corollary to the exercise of executive powers and the potential use of force,
all agreements include rather detailed provisions regarding the privileges and
immunities of the members of the teams, largely duplicating the standard rules in
EU SOFAs/SOMAs (see here an example). Two aspects are worth attention here.
First, in line with the standard EU SOFA/SOMA models, the agreements with Albania
and Serbia ensure team members cannot be obliged to give evidence as a witness
before the competent authority of the third country. By contrast, under the agreement
with Montenegro team members can be obliged under certain conditions to provide
evidence according to national procedural law. Second, the possibility to waive
immunity and to subject a team member to another jurisdiction does not seem to
cover Frontex’s own statutory staff. This arguably creates a liability gap with regard
to the agency’s own operational staff arguably contravening the requirement in the
Frontex Regulation that the status agreement covers the civil and criminal liability of
the members of the teams.
Too much unchecked power? Data processing and
fundamental rights protection
Given the wide-ranging powers and tasks that the team members may perform
in third countries, it is not surprising that all Frontex status agreements include
provisions regarding fundamental rights and data processing. Indeed, all agreements
impose on each party to make available a complaint mechanism for alleged
breaches of fundamental rights during operations. Yet, no additional safeguards
are included regarding minimum access conditions, information duties, impartiality,
or redress. In all agreements the scope of data processing is broadly defined as
whenever necessary for the implementation of the status agreement. On the EU
side, the processing of personal data is subject to the EU relevant legal framework,
in particular the GDPR and Directive 2016/680, for participating Member States, and
Regulation 2018/1725 supplemented by Frontex measures (yet to be adopted) for
agency staff. In case of transfers of personal data to the third country, the agency
and the Member States are required to indicate restrictions on access and use,
including onward transfers. A data processing report must be prepared by the parties
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at the end of each action and forwarded to the Frontex fundamental rights officer and
data protection officer.
To guarantee their conformity with the constitutional rules of the Union, the status
agreements should closely follow Frontex’s legal framework and should entail
adequate safeguards to preserve EU fundamental values. Therefore, agreements
should have included an explicit prohibition on onward transfers of personal data
to third countries or provide for reasonable data retention periods. Moreover, the
scarcity of provisions regarding data subject rights and effective legal remedies
suggests that these agreements might fall short of providing appropriate safeguards
regarding protection of fundamental rights at EU standards.
It is therefore a positive sign that Article 73(3) of the new regulation multiplies
fundamental rights and data protection guarantees by imposing that future status
agreements include ‘practical measures related to the respect for fundamental rights’
and a complaints mechanism. Further, the European Data Protection Supervisor
(EDPS) must be consulted on the provisions related to data transfers where
they ‘differ substantially’ from the Commission’s model agreement. In view of the
extended (including also EUROSUR) and potentially intrusive data processing
taking place under the status agreements, the consultation of the EDPS is welcome,
though it might be problematic to establish a substantial difference from the model
agreement. Finally, Article 76(1) of Regulation 2019/1896 subjects the Commission
to an extensive consultation duty (Member States; Frontex; Fundamental Rights
Agency, EDPS) before adopting the template for new status agreement. Yet, it is not
clear whether the Commission is bound by any procedural obligations (e.g. explain
why advise is not followed) during the consultation process.
Outlook on the future of Frontex status agreements
Frontex status agreements have a short and rather inconclusive past, but they
definitely have a future. The agreements with Western Balkan countries inaugurate
a new stage of the EIBM through the territorial extension of Frontex-coordinated
operations to third country territories. However, this revolutionary development
comes with fundamental questions and challenges as already illustrated by the
current practice.
Regulation 2019/1896 extends the scope of status agreements and brings fine-
tunings that already require amendments to the existing Commission’s model
agreement and status agreements. It arguably contributes to bringing the legal
framework of the exterritorial activities of Frontex closer to EU law and fundamental
rights standards. In any case, the most recent Frontex mandate revision will likely
lead to more status agreements being concluded with third countries. One recurring
concern with respect to the operational cooperation in third countries based on
current and future status agreements is to ensure the required consistency with EU
law and fundamental rights standards.
- 5 -
